基于模糊回收价格的逆向供应链定价策略研究

Price Decision for Reverse Supply Chain Based on Fuzzy Recycling Price

  • 摘要: 在由单一制造商和单一零售商构成的逆向供应链系统中,回收产品质量的不确定性导致回收价格的不确定性.针对这种不确定性,将回收价格看作三角模糊数,应用模糊理论和博弈理论对回收价格浮动的基准点进行决策,分别得出了两个非合作博弈的均衡解(斯坦克尔伯格均衡和纳什均衡)和一个合作博弈的均衡解(联合定价),并给出了各均衡条件下制造商和零售商各自回收价格的浮动范围.

     

    Abstract: In the reverse supply chain(RSC) composed of a manufacturer and a retailer,quality uncertainty for recycling products may result in uncertainty of the recycling price.For this reason,considering the recycling price as a triangular fuzzy number,the basic point for recycling price fluctuation is decided with fuzzy theory and game theory,and two non-cooperative game equilibriums(Stackelberg equilibrium and Nash equilibrium) and a cooperative game equilibrium(coordination in price decision) are obtained.Moreover,fluctuating scopes of recycling prices under each equilibrium circumstance for the manufacturer and the retailer are presented.

     

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