Physical Layer Spoofing Attacks Based on CIR Fluctuation Amplitude and Phase Joint Equivalence

In open wireless networks, physical layer security is a valuable addition to upper-layer security measures. Investigating targeted defense mechanisms involves the critical and challenging task of designing a physical layer spoofing attack that proves effective in real-time scenarios and elusive to detection. We present a spoofing attack method based on the joint equivalence of channel impulse response (CIR) fluctuation amplitude and phase. Moreover, to address the limitation of existing research, which relies only on single CIR amplitude information with limited simulation ability for fine-grained characteristics, we integrate both CIR amplitude and phase information to model position spoofing attacks, thereby improving the attack success rate. Additionally, theoretical analysis confirms that the matrix formed by CIR is ill-conditioned, elucidating the main factor responsible for significant deviations in the effectiveness of the attack caused by small fluctuations in CIR. Furthermore, to address the challenge of data fusion when the matrix is ill-conditioned due to differences in amplitude and phase, the CIR amplitude/phase fluctuation distance is aligned equivalently. Through analysis, a CIR similarity threshold is established to identify the optimal CIR for the attack, thereby mitigating attack biases resulting from minor fluctuations in the data. Numerous experiments have been performed using datasets from two typical scenarios. The results indicate that the proposed attack strategy can successfully launch attacks in locations where previous spoofing methods attack may have failed compared with the existing spoofing attacks. Additionally, the success rate of the attack against both amplitude and phase detection methods is higher.